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NOTE
WRONGFUL BIRTH IN THE ABORTION
CONTEXT- CRITIQUE OF EXISTING CASE LAW AND
PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
With increased recognition of the need for and desirability of
family planning, couples are attempting to limit the size of their
own families not only through preventing conception by steriliza-
tion and use of birth control pills, but also by terminating preg-
nancy through abortion. As birth control devices were becoming
more popular there developed a new area of the law, referred to
as wrongful birth actions, in which parents sued third persons in
contract or negligence for unwanted births. Typically these ac-
tions have been against birth control manufacturers' and drug-
gists2 for producing or dispensing ineffective birth control pills, or
against doctors for performing unsuccessful sterilizations.3
Recently, with the increased public approval of abortion, the
phenomenon of wrongful birth suits is appearing in that context
as well. The purpose of this article is to examine the development
of the wrongful birth concept in the abortion area. It should be
stressed that the subject of this note, wrongful birth actions, is
not the same as so-called wrongful life actions. Wrongful life ac-
tions differ from those for wrongful birth in that the former are
brought by individuals for the wrong of their very own existence.
They present unique legal and philosophical problems which are
not found in wrongful birth actions, problems which will not be
discussed in this note.4
' Whittington v. Eli Lilly & Co., 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.W. Va. 1971).
2 Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); Custodio v.
Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Shaheen v. Knight. 11 Pa. D. &
C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957). Among the more recent sterilization cases are Herrera v. Roessing.
533 P.2d 60 (Colo. App. 1975); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974):
Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Betancourt v. Gaylor. 136
N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973).
See note 56 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the problem of assess-
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In the abortion context, wrongful birth actions have arisen
where the doctor has failed to diagnose pregnancy in time for the
woman to seek an abortion.' They have also arisen where the
doctor has failed to diagnose rubella in the mother during preg-
nancy or has failed to inform her of the high risk that rubella may
cause the child to be deformed. Unaware of the attendant risks,
the mother did not terminate the pregnancy, and the baby was
born with a defect.'
This article will concentrate on these types of factual set-
tings. The abortion type of wrongful birth actions will be ana-
lyzed against the background of other wrongful birth actions in
the past few years. As will be seen, there has been little consist-
ency in this area. Therefore, a suggested approach which would
lead to more continuity in future decisions will be presented.
I. THE ILLUSORY TURNING POINT
Until 1971 plaintiffs had little success in wrongful birth ac-
tions. Courts were unwilling to grant recovery and dismissed such
actions on the grounds that public policy prohibited recovery for
the "blessing" of a child. The courts made a basic assumption
that every child is such a joy to his or her parents that any recov-
ery for the birth of that unexpected child is precluded.7
In 1971 in Troppi v. Scarf,' the Michigan Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff may recover the expenses of rearing an un-
planned child. The defendant in Troppi was a druggist who had
negligently dispensed tranquilizers instead of birth control pills
to the plaintiff. The court rejected the blessing doctrine., It held
that damages for wrongful birth are not so speculative as to pre-
ing damages in wrongful life actions see Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life",
I ISRAEL L. REv. 513 (1966).
-1 Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974); Rieck v. Medi-
cal Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372
(1975).
' Two cases which set forth this argument, and which have been frequently cited
therefor, are Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934) and Shaheen
v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957).
11 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
Id. at 253, 187 N.W.2d at 517. The court also noted that, where the state so strongly
advocated family planning as to include payments for contraceptives in its welfare pro-
gram, it could not be said that public policy disfavored contraception. Id.
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clude recovery, setting forth the benefit doctrine. This doctrine
recognizes that a child brings certain benefits which should be
subtracted from any detriment to determine the plaintiff's dam-
ages."'
Because this was the first instance in which a court had
rejected the theories which had prevented recovery, Troppi was
heralded by many as the turning point in the area of wrongful
birth cases." The case certainly seemed to indicate a complete
reversal in the trend. The court made special note of the fact that
contraception is within the constitutionally protected "zone of
privacy" described in Griswold v. Connecticut,'2 and that the
state cannot infringe on a right within that zone. "Since the State
may not infringe upon this right," the court reasoned, "it may not
constitutionally denigrate the right by completely denying pro-
tection provided as a matter of course to like rights."' 3
Troppi seemed to indicate that courts, in deciding wrongful
birth cases, were at last recognizing that family planning de-
served encouragement and protection. Since the Troppi decision,
The so-called 'benefit rule' is pertinent. The Restatement declares:
'Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or
to his property and in so doing has conferred upon the plaintiff a special
benefit to the interest which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred
is considered in mitigation of damages, where this is equitable.'
Id. at 254, 187 N.W.2d at 517-18, quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 920 at 616 (1966).
" For a discussion of Troppi, its history, and its predicted impact on future wrongful
birth cases see Thayer, Liability to a Family for Negligence Resulting in the Conception
and Birth of a Child, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 181 (1972); Note, Busting, the Blessing Balloon:
Liability for the Birth of an Unplanned Child, 39 ALB. L. REV. 221 (1975): Note.
Misfeasance in the Pharmacy: A Bundle of "Fun, Joy and Affection?", 8 CAL. W.L. REV.
341 (1972); Note, Birth of Healthy But Unplanned Child Due to Pharmacist's Negligence
Held a Compensable Injury, 3 SET. HALL L. REV. 492 (1972); Note, Recovery of Child
Support for "Wrongful Birth", 47 TUL. L. REV. 225 (1972), Note. Negligently Filled Pre-
scription for Birth Control Pill Results in Recovery for Birth of Normal Child. 40
U.M.K.C.L. REV. 264 (1971-72); Comment, A Married Couple Can Recover Damages for
the Birth of a Healthy Child Which Resulted From a Pharmacist's Negligent Filling of
the Couple's Prescription for Oral Contraceptives, 38 BROOK. L. RExv. 531 (1971); Com-
ment, Parents Allowed Recovery of Expenses in Having and Rearing an Unwanted Child
Where Pharmacist Negligently Dispensed Birth Control Pills, 3 CUMBER. SAM. L. REv. 220
(1972); Comment, Cause of Action for Birth of Unwanted Child Due to Negligent Dispens-
ing of Oral Contraceptives, 76 DICK. L. REV. 402 (1972); Comment, Damage Suits Against
Pharmacists and Physicians Based on Negligence in Birth Control Treatments. 13 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 666 (1972).
12 31 Mich. App. at 253, 187 N.W.2d at 517, citing Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 I.S.
479. 485 (1965).
" 31 Mich. App. at 253-54, 187 N.W.2d at 517 (footnote omitted).
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abortion has also gained more general acceptance as a legitimate
family planning method. Roe v. Wade 4 clearly established the
constitutional right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy,,5 and
thereby discredited the argument that public policy does not sup-
port abortions.
Not only has the public policy argument been stripped of its
validity, but also the damages issue has been resolved in a logical
manner; Troppi met the problem by applying the benefits rule
and weighing the injury against the benefits conferred on the
parents by the child. " Thus, when one looks at Troppi and Roe
one can see that the two hurdles which had prevented recovery
in earlier wrongful birth actions have been met. After those deci-
sions, one would logically have expected an extension of wrongful
birth recoveries to abortion cases. However, subsequent cases
have cast some doubt on that expectation.
II. PosT-Troppi DEVELOPMENTS
In cases decided after Troppi which involved sterilization,
plaintiffs generally have not fared well. In Terrell v. Garcia7 the
defendant physician unsuccessfully performed a tubal ligation to
sterilize the mother. Thereafter she gave birth to a normal
healthy child and sued for the cost of rearing and educating the
child. In denying recovery the court impliedly rejected Troppi,
holding that public policy precluded recovery because the ex-
pense of a child is offset by the joy and companionship a child
brings.
Coleman v. Garrison5 was based on a factual situation simi-
lar to that in Terrell. Once again the court held for the defendant,
14 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe struck down the Texas abortion statute, which excepted
from criminality only those abortions performed to save the life of the mother, holding
such statutes to be violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court established that, during the first trimester of pregnancy, the abortion decision
should be left to the medical judgment of the woman's attending physician; in the second
trimester, the State may regulate the abortion procedure to promote its interest in the
mother's health; and, in the third trimester, the State may regulate and even proscribe
abortion except where necessary for the preservation of the mother's health. Id. at 164-
65.
Id. at 153.
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). See note 10 supra and
accompanying text.
" 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
" 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974).
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and stated that there can be no cause of action for wrongful birth
because to hold otherwise would be to rule as a matter of law that
under certain circumstances a child is not worth the trouble and
expense necessary to bring him into the world. The court also
relied on the notion that damages would be too speculative."9
One sterilization case where the plaintiffs prevailed is
Betancourt v. Gaylor.20 The New Jersey Superior Court held that
any loss or damage proximately resulting from a negligent sterili-
zation operation, including the costs, emotional distress, and in-
convenience of rearing the child, may be recovered. The opinion
stated, "mere uncertainty as to the amount of damage should not
preclude the right of recovery."'" "In light of the law's recent
recognition of a woman's right to control her bodily functions,"
the court reasoned, "the trier of the facts should be permitted to
evaluate whatever damages plaintiffs are entitled to."2
Since 1971 there have been four major wrongful birth cases
based on a third person's negligence after conception. In Ziemba
v. Sternberg"' the New York Supreme Court held that an action
does lie against a doctor for his negligence in failing to diagnose
a woman's pregnancy soon enough for her to terminate it. Rieck
v. Medical Protective Co., 4 a Wisconsin case based on facts simi-
lar to those in Ziemba, held that to allow recovery would violate
public policy and encourage fraudulent claims. The cause of ac-
tion was recognized in Jacobs v. Theimer2 and Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hospital" wherein parents sued their physicians for
failing to diagnose that the wife had contracted rubella while
pregnant. Although the two courts recognized a tort, both limited
' The court did go so far as to develop a new type of action called "wrongful preg-
nancy," in which damages would be limited to those incident to the unplanned pregnancy.
Id. at 761. However, it found nothing to indicate the operation was performed negligently.
and denied any recovery. It does not seem that any subsequent cases have adopted this
idea of an action limited to the expenses and damages attendant to an unexpected preg-
nancy.
136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975).
"Id. at 73, 344 A.2d at 340.
22 Id. at 72, 344 A.2d at 339, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1967).
1 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
-" 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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damages to compensation for the burden related to the child's
defects.
Given the expectations raised by the decisions in Troppi and
Roe, why are the courts not permitting a plaintiff to receive the
cost of rearing the child if the burden of proving the doctor's
negligence in failing to diagnose the pregnancy or failing to diag-
nose rubella during the pregnancy has been met? To answer this
question, the four cases described above will be analyzed closely
to develop an understanding of the reasoning courts have hereto-
fore followed. Some other meritorious approaches that have been
propounded in dissenting as well as majority opinions will also be
examined to formulate a model approach which could lead to
more stability in this area of the law.
HI. THE ABORTION CASES ANALYZED
A. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co. 7
In Rieck the plaintiff mother sued her doctor for failing to
diagnose her pregnancy in time for her to seek an abortion. The
court held that to allow recovery would contravene public pol-
icy,2" would award damages out of proportion to the defendant's
culpability, and would encourage fraudulent claims. 9 The court
noted that the parents did not attempt to place the baby for
adoption to mitigate damages, and that no evidence had been
presented that the child would be unwelcome.
Rieck represents a return to the blessing doctrine, emphasiz-
ing the intangible benefits the plaintiffs would receive from their
unplanned child. :"'
It is such retention of benefits-the parents keeping their child, and
seeking to transfer only the financial costs of its upbringing to the
doctor-that is a relevant factor in evaluating the public policy
considerations involved."
2 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
'2 Id. at 518, 219 N.W.2d at 245. In support of its public policy argument the court
cited Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) and Shaheen v. Knight, II
Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957).
64 Wis. 2d 514, 519, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1974).
Every child's smile, every bond of love and affection, every reason for
parental pride in a child's achievements. every contribution by the child to
the welfare and well-being of the family and parents, is to remain with the
mother and father.
Id. at 518, 219 N.W.2d at 244.
I: d. at 519. 219 N.W.2d at 245.
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The case reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court when the defen-
dant appealed an overruling of its demurrer. Although at this
point no factual resolution had been made, the court decided, as
a matter of law, that every child brings happiness to his or her
parents. Thus a physician cannot be held liable for the costs of
raising such child, even though his negligence was the direct and
proximate cause of the child's birth. On what basis can such an
assumption be made? First, one must question the notion that
every parent receives joy and happiness from his or her offspring.
The number of child abuse cases in this country is an indicator
that such an "axiom" may be an overstatement. Secondly, even
where a parent does reap certain joys from the child, it is not
necessarily true that those delights totally offset the burden, both
emotional and economic, of the unplanned addition to the family.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not mention the possibility of
allowing the case to go to trial so that benefits and damages could
be weighed in the particular family setting. Instead the court
pointed out that the parents could have placed the child for adop-
tion and avoided any injury.32 The problem with this argument
is that the decision to bear a child and the decision to give up
one's own baby after it is born involve different emotional and
philosophical problems. The decision to keep the child may be an
indication of the satisfaction the parents are receiving, and
thereby lessen the total damages figure, but it does not vitiate the
action.
The second concern of the court in Rieck was that the
amount of damages sought would be totally out of proportion to
the culpability of the defendant doctor.33 One need only consider
the types of recovery granted in personal injury cases to see the
emptiness of this argument. Plaintiffs in a wrongful birth action
seek damages for a period of 18 to 21 years, the time during which
the child would be a minor. In a personal injury case damages are
frequently sought for injuries that will last the rest of a plaintiffs
.- Id.
To permit the parents to keep their child and shift the entire cost of
its upbringing to a physician who failed to determine or inform them of the
fact of pregnancy would be to create a new category of surrogate parent.
Id. at 518, 219 N.W.2d at 244. "[Tlhe allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable
a burden upon physicians, under the facts and circumstances here alleged." Id. at 518-
19, 219 N.W.2d at 245.
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life. If a 20-year-old loses a limb due to a defendant's negligence
his recovery may include pain and suffering and lost wages for a
period of over 50 years. This would be no more out of proportion
to culpability than in the Rieck situation.
Perhaps one reason behind the court's determination that
any damages would be out of proportion to the physician's degree
of fault is the fact that the court did not offset any of the eco-
nomic injuries by the benefits. Had this been done, the court
could have said the physician must bear all of the "hard money
damages" while the parents enjoyed all of the intangible bene-
fits.,4
The third point set forth in Rieck is that, if the plaintiffs were
granted recovery, the door would be opened to fraudulent claims.
This fear was based on the importance in such an action of
subjective testimony as to the parents' intent not to have any
more children and as to their decision that, had they known of
the pregnancy, they would have taken steps to terminate it."
Undoubtedly there are persons who will attempt to receive a
windfall by asserting a fraudulent claim. However, should this be
a basis for denying relief to the deserving plaintiff? This fear of
facilitating fraudulent actions has arisen in other areas of the law,
particularly regarding the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. In that area one court has held that administra-
tive difficulties cannot justify denial of relief for serious invasion
of mental tranquility. 3 Battalla v. State37 emphasized that
"[a]lthough fraud, extra litigation and a measure of speculation
are, of course, possibilities, it is no reason for a court to eschew a
measure of its jurisdiction."" Whether or not a particular claim
is valid is a matter to be assessed by the court and jury in each
case. Here, as in the area of emotional distress, much evidence
must be directed toward the plaintiff's state of mind. However,
in both instances objective evidence can be used to prove the
subjective elements. The plaintiff's actions, doctors' testimony,
and the testimony of others who associate with the plaintiff often
3' Id. at 518, 219 N.W.2d at 244-45.
Id. at 519, 219 N.W.2d at 245.
31 State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952).
37 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
31 Id. at 240-41, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37, 176 N.E.2d at 731.
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reveal the necessary information about the plaintiff's state of
mind. The court should not refuse to perform its function or to
allow the jury to perform its duties merely because the task may
be difficult. If recovery could be denied whenever fear of
fraudulent complaints existed, plaintiffs' claims in many areas of
the law would be refused without being heard by a jury."
B. Ziemba v. Sternberg4 "
Ziemba also presented the issue of whether a woman could
recover where the defendant doctor negligently failed to diagnose
her pregnancy in time for her to obtain a safe abortion. The
plaintiffs, husband and wife, sought not only damages incident
to the pregnancy but also the cost of raising the child. Although
the court did not deal with the issue of determining damages, it
held that plaintiffs did have a cause of action and cited Roe v.
Wade4' in recognition of the courts' changing attitudes toward
abortion.2
Ziemba offers a more constructive approach than does Rieck.
While the latter ignored the implications of Roe v. Wade,43
Ziemba recognized "that the United States Supreme Court has
articulated the constitutional right of a woman to seek such a
If the right to recover for injury resulting from the wrongful conduct
could be defeated whenever such dangers exist, many of the grievances the
law deals with would be eliminated. That some claims may be spurious
should not compel those who administer justice to shut their eyes to serious
wrongs and let them go without being brought to account. It is the function
of courts and juries to determine whether claims are valid or false.
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961).
"1 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974). For a discussion of Ziemba within
the New York legal setting see Note, Busting the Blessing Balloon: Liability for the Birth
of an Unplanned Child, 39 ALB. L. REV. 221, 229 (1975).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
45 App. Div. 2d at 232-33, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 268-69. The court distinguished Stewart
v. Long Island College Hospital, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d
695, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640, 283 N.E.2d 616 (1972), a previous wrongful birth case in which
recovery was denied where defendant hospital refused to perform an abortion and plaintiff
mother bore a deformed child. Here, the court noted, a different legal environment ex-
isted; abortions at the time of Stewart were illegal, whereas not only were they now legal.
but a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy
had been recognized by the Court in Roe. 45 App. Div. 2d at 232-33, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 268-
69.
1:1 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe was decided on January 22, 1973, 5 months before Mrs.
Rieck was informed erroneously by the defendant that she was not pregnant. Rieck v.
Medical Protective Co.. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
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medical procedure [as abortion] in the first trimester of preg-
nancy."" The entire Ziemba opinion is one addressed to the pub-
lic policy arguments against allowing such a silit. It is an attempt
to view the action in its current milieu. 5
The Ziemba case reached the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court on defendant's appeal of a lower court ruling
denying his motion to dismiss. Thus, the opinion was directed to
the sufficiency of the complaint, and not to the damages issue.
The court held only that damages sustained by the plaintiffs may
flow from the physician's malpractice, and that the plaintiffs
should be compensated. No suggestion was given concerning
what damages might be considered proper. Thus, Ziemba has
resolved only half of the problems raised by a wrongful birth
abortion action, and provides no guidance as to the damages
issue.
C. Jacobs v. Theimer
4
6
In February 1975 the Texas Supreme Court decided Jacobs,
a suit by a husband and wife against their physician for failing
to diagnose that the wife had contracted rubella while pregnant
and to advise them of the risks that the child might be deformed.
They sought medical expenses for treatment and care of their
child, who was born with defective major organs, and alleged
that, had they been informed, the pregnancy would have been
terminated. At the time of the wife's pregnancy, abortions other
than for the safety of the mother were still illegal in Texas. 7
Nevertheless, the court held that, at the time the action arose,
the question of whether to terminate the pregnancy was one for
the parents to resolve. 41 The court saw no problem with finding
" 45 App. Div. 2d at 232-33, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 269, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
See note 42 supra.
519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
17 The plaintiff contracted rubella in July 1968 and the child was born in March 1969.
Id. at 847.
" The trial court and the civil court of appeals granted summary judgment for the
defendant on the ground that such an abortion as plaintiffs contended they would have
sought was prohibited under the state's penal code. The Texas Supreme Court pointed
out that the doctor would have suffered no criminal liability unless he actually advised
the plaintiffs to terminate the pregnancy, and unless they did so upon such advice. Here




that the doctor was under a duty to disclose the diagnosis of
rubella and the risks attendant to continuing the pregnancy, and
thus held that if a jury were to find he failed to meet that duty,
plaintiffs would be entitled to the damages proximately caused
by that failure.
The damages issue here differed from that of Rieck because
the parents sought only those expenses necessary to treat the
child's deformity and the damages for their own emotional suffer-
ing. This distinction played a crucial role in the court's decision.
In Gleitman v. Cosgrove,2 the court had denied recovery of child-
rearing expenses on similar facts. The court in Jacobs agreed with
the Gleitman holding, but distinguished it on the damages issue,
stating that the public policy obstacles where an award would be
based on "speculation as to the quality of life and as to the pluses
and minuses of parental mind and emotion" do not exist where
only the costs related to the physical defects of the child are
sought.' However, what the court did in effect was to allow plain-
tiffs the value of the difference between a healthy child and a
deformed child. The doctor was not responsible for the child's
deformity; he could have done nothing to make that child
healthy. The defendant's assumed negligence precluded the
choice between seeking an abortion and risking the birth of a
deformed child. Admittedly, the parents here were not seeking
expenses for raising and educating their child, but the court made
clear that, if they had, their claim would not have been sustained.
D. Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital"
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in September 1975 held that
a doctor who fails to diagnose rubella in a pregnant woman and
to advise her of the possible effects of the disease on the fetus is
liable for injuries sustained because of any deformity. The court
required the parents to show that they would have sought an
abortion for the wife had they been informed of her illness and
its effects.
only that the defendant should have given them information as to Mrs.
Jacobs' condition and then, with the information she had a right to expect
from her doctor, the decision would have been made by the plaintiffs them-
selves to terminate the pregnancy.
Id. at 848.
49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975).
69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
1976
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
As in Jacobs,5" the facts of Dumer occurred prior to the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. 3 Never-
theless, the court opined that the choice of whether or not to
submit to an abortion is for the parents to make. Dumer limited
damages to those expenses reasonably suffered by reason of the
child's deformities. In this regard the court expressly distin-
guished Rieck, noting that in the latter case the parents sought
the expenses of raising a normal, healthy child. 4
IV. OTHER VIEWPOINTS
Justice Weintraub's dissent in Gleitman v. Cosgrove55 offers
a constructive approach to wrongful birth actions where defen-
dant's negligence was the cause of a mother's not obtaining an
abortion. There both the parents and the child were suing. Wein-
traub agreed with the majority that the child's action must fail
because the court was asked to recognize a right not to be born."
However, he emphasized that the parents do have a maintainable
action. His opinion noted that ordinarily a parent's claim is deriv-
ative of the child's claim, and if in the instant case the parents'
claim were viewed as derivative, it would not be allowable be-
cause the defendants did not injure the child. 7 The dissent
stated, however, that the mother was personally injured by the
denial of her right to choose whether or not to bear the child, and
:' Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
' Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d at 770 n.6, 233 N.W. 2d at 377 n.6 (1975).
The child was born November 19, 1972, 2 months before the Supreme Court decided Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" Id. at 769, 233 N.W.2d at 376, citing Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d
514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
" 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
"' [Tihe choice is between a worldly existence and none at all. Implicit,
beyond this claim against a physician for faulty advice, is the proposition
that a pregnant woman who, duly informed, does not seek an abortion, and
all who urge her to see the pregnancy through, are guilty of wrongful injury
to the fetus, and indeed that every day in which the infant is sustained after
birth is a day of wrong. To recognize a right not to be born is to enter an
area in which no one could find his way.
Id. at 63, 227 A.2d at 711.
57 [Ilt seems to me that the parent's claim for the infant's cure and care
must ultimately presuppose it would have been to the child's own interest
not to have been born. The claim for cure and care is the child's, whether it
is asserted on the child's behalf against a wrongdoer or against the mother
or father or anyone else who in law must furnish it . . ..
Id. at 64, 227 A.2d at 711.
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that the father was also injured, because he was so directly in-
volved in the mother's decision. Weintraub believed that the trier
of fact should be allowed to measure the cost of losing that right.
His opinion suggested trying to balance in some way the injury
caused by having a deformed child with the pluses in the par-
ent/child relationship and stressed that "[tihe pain of the par-
ents must be measured against the joy they find in him [the
childl as he is."" While Weintraub recognized the difficulty in
placing a price on the loss of the choice whether or not to risk
bearing a deformed child, he believed the law should compensate
in some way.
There is much merit to this approach, which can be applied
in the Ziemba/Rieck type of factual situation as well, because the
key is that the parent was injured through loss of the right to
choose whether or not to enter into a parent/child relationship.
The result does not have to turn on whether or not the child was
healthy.
Although Terrell v. Garcia9 is a sterilization case, the dis-
senting opinion by Justice Cadena offers some arguments useful
in formulating an approach to the abortion cases. While rejecting
the social policy arguments of the majority, the dissent pointed
out that Griswold and Roe have established the right of persons
to prevent conception and terminate an existing pregnancy.
It is, therefore, impermissible to say that social policy requires that
a husband and wife be denied the right to limit the number of
children which they will bring into the world, or that a person shall
be allowed, by his negligent conduct, to frustrate the realization of
the married couple's aim to limit the size of their family."
The dissent criticized the majority' for arguing that damages
would be too difficult to prove. Analogies were drawn to actions
by parents for loss of companionship and comfort upon the
wrongful death of their children," as well as to alienation of affec-
tion suits for loss of consortium.2 If courts can place a price tag
Id. at 65, 227 A.2d at 712.
' 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 129, citing Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1971); Lockhart
v. Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967); Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113
N.W.2d 355 (1962); PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 121 at 930 (3d. ed. 1964).




on these losses, certainly they can do so in wrongful birth cases
as well. As Justice Cadena emphasized, the fact that damages are
difficult to ascertain is no reason for a court to refuse to even try
to compensate the plaintiff.
The third point raised by Justice Cadena is that those factors
which may mitigate damages do not defeat the action. He re-
jected the blessing doctrine, finding no basis for the assumption
that the plaintiffs experience any joy and satisfaction from rais-
ing an unwanted child. 3 In his opinion, the birth of that child
may be a catastrophe for the entire family.
The doctor whose negligence brings about such an undesired birth
should not be allowed to say, "I did you a favor," secure in the
knowledge that the courts will give to this claim the effect of an
irrebuttable presumption."
In Jackson v. Anderson,15 a sterilization wrongful birth case
in which the action was upheld, the defendant contended that the
normal birth of a healthy child precludes recovery on public pol-
icy grounds. There the plaintiff had been sterilized upon a doc-
tor's advice because of difficulty with previous deliveries. The
court stated that it is well established that prior to normal deliv-
ery of the child an action would lie. Thus defendant's contention
would result in an anomalous situation, wherein the same plain-
tiff would be able to recover if the final hearing occurred before
delivery. "IT]he fallacy in appellee's argument is clear: he sug-
gests as vitiating liability a fact which mitigates damages."6 In
assessing damages the court pointed out that the child is to be
looked upon as unplanned rather than as unwanted. Although at
first glance this may seem a matter of semantics, the statement
emphasizes that the damages the plaintiffs are entitled to are the
expenses of raising this child that they did not plan, offset by the
benefits that the child brings them. The court seems to be under-
lining the fact that the plaintiffs are not trying to argue that the
Perhaps these parents, in deciding that they did not want to pay the
price for the enjoyment and pleasures which "normal" parents would derive
from the birth of an unwanted child, were not acting as "normal" persons.
But it is hornbook law that a tort feasor must take his victim as he finds him
and has no right to insist on a "normal" victim.
Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 131.




child is unloved, but that nevertheless they suffered injury by the
unexpected addition to the family.
V. A VIABLE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
Various approaches to these actions have been examined to
find some guidance in formulating a framework of analysis which
will recognize the direction in which courts are going and over-
come the weak points of past decisions. The two key issues are
public policy and damages. Although they are interrelated, the
simplest way to clarify the problems is to treat each separately,
resolving one at a time.
A. Public Policy
With respect to the public policy arguments, the courts must
view these cases in the current social setting. When the blessing
doctrine was first propounded in 1934,7 family planning was
practically unheard of. Contraceptives were not yet accepted, and
abortions were performed in secret by disreputable doctors or
quacks in unsanitary surroundings. The average family was larger
than today's family." The woman's role was to bear and raise
children. Today, in contrast, there is a major concern with the
population explosion, and parents are realizing what an economic
and emotional burden a large family can be. Many couples plan
how many children they will have and how far apart in age they
will be. Abortions, although still controversial, are no longer
shrouded in secrecy, and are performed by respected members of
the medical profession on women of all ages and life styles. The
public recognizes that for some people a child is not a blessing.
Not only has the social setting changed radically since 1934,
but the legal setting has also. Roe v. Wade made clear that abor-
tions in the first trimester are legal, and recognized that a woman
has a constitutional right to choose whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy during that period. 9 In a number of states it has
been held that if Medicaid programs reimburse for life-saving
abortions, they must also bear the cost of any nontherapeutic
67 Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934), is the case in which
the blessing doctrine gained its popularity.
" In 1910 the average family size was 5 children per married woman; in 1940 that
average was 3.2 children and between 1957 and 1959 the average was only 2.8 children. L.
DUBLIN, FACTBOOK ON MAN 22 (2d ed. 1965).
" 410 U.S. 113. 153 (1973).
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abortions performed on women eligible for Medicaid.7 These de-
velopments indicate that today public policy favors non-
therapeutic abortions.
The other portion of the public policy argument is that by
allowing the action, a court would, in effect, be deciding that no
life is better than life.7 This may be very true in a wrongful life
action where the damage to plaintiff is his very existence.72 How-
ever, this is not the case in wrongful birth actions. In the latter
situation, the parent is not bringing a derivative action for the
child but rather is suing in his or her own right. There is no issue
of whether or not a person would have been better off had he
never been born. The allegation is that due to the doctor's negli-
gence the plaintiff was unable to make an informed choice
whether or not to take on the parent/child relationship. It is the
mother's right to decide if she wants the child to be born. If
someone deprives her of that right she has been wronged. The
father has also been wronged due to the important part he plays
in that decision. If a doctor breaches his duty of reasonable care,
and as a result of such breach the mother is unable to make an
informed choice to continue or terminate her pregnancy, she
should be compensated for the damages proximately caused by
such negligence. Public policy and Roe v. Wade mandate that
every protection be given that right to choose.
B. Damages
Recognizing that denial of the right to choose to have an
abortion is an injury, one must next determine how that injury
is to be compensated. In evaluating the extent of the damages
71 See, e.g., Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 422 U.S.
1041 (1975); Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp.
17:3 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
7' See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. 1974); Gleitman v. Cos-
grove, 49 N.J. 22, 29-30, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).
72 Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life", 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 513 (1966), points
out that the traditional measure of damages is a comparison of the plaintiff's position
before the damage and the worsened position in which he finds himself as a result of the
tort-feasor's act. The article sets out the crucial problem in a wrongful life case:
In our case, however, no comparison is possible since were it not for the act
of birth the infant would not exist. By his cause of action, the plaintiff cuts





three situations must be considered. The first is where the parent
wanted to have a child and the doctor negligently failed to diag-
nose the pregnancy. Here the parents were not given an opportun-
ity to choose whether or not to terminate the pregnancy, but there
have been no damages. They would have chosen to bear the child
anyway.
The second category is where the parent wanted a child and
knew of the pregnancy, but the doctor negligently failed to diag-
nose rubella or some other occurrence which is likely to cause
birth defects. Had the parents been fully informed, they might
have terminated the pregnancy to avoid the risk of deformity.
Here the damages turn on whether or not the baby is born de-
formed. If the child is normal, the parents have nothing to be
compensated for. However, if the child is deformed, they have a
compensable injury. In both instances the parents were denied
the right to make an informed choice whether or not to have the
baby and take the attendant risks. In the first there was nothing
for which to compensate them, because they had wanted a child
and the child was healthy. In the second they were injured by the
birth of the deformed child when they could have avoided the
birth had the doctor used reasonable care. The measure of the
damages here is not the difference between a healthy child and
one that is deformed. The option open to the parents involved
either the risk of a deformed child or no child at all. Thus, the
correct measure of damages is the full cost of raising this child
offset by the benefits the child brings.
The third category is that of the woman who would have
aborted had the doctor informed her she was pregnant. Here the
injury does not turn on whether or not the baby is healthy. She
has been damaged by being denied the opportunity to terminate
the pregnancy. The child, regardless of the fact that it is healthy,
was not wanted or planned for. Although unplanned, that child
will probably be loved and bring happiness to the parents. How-
ever, it will also bring all the hardships that the parents had
wanted to avoid. For these, offset by the benefits, the parents are
entitled to compensation. But for the doctor's negligence, damage
could have been prevented.
In wrongful birth actions determining the cost of the parents'
injuries involves a weighing of the pluses and minuses caused by
the unplanned addition to the family (or, in the rubella cases, by
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the deformed child). The circumstances of the individual family
cannot be ignored. If the plaintiffs made no effort to terminate
their parental rights so that someone could adopt the child, that
may indicate that they will receive joy and satisfaction from the
child. Thus, it would reduce the damages recoverable. However,
such failure to place the child for adoption may also be because
the plaintiffs could not face the emotional trauma of giving up
their own child after its birth. In such case the damages would
not necessarily be greatly reduced as a result. In measuring the
injury the court must look to the size of the family and its finan-
cial situation. Some pertinent questions may be: Did the mother
have a career; had the plaintiffs determined for philosophical or
emotional reasons that they did not want any (or any more) chil-
dren; what age are the plaintiffs? All of these considerations must
be a part of the process of measuring damages. It is admittedly a
difficult task to view the full picture, examining not only the
economic factors but also such intangible aspects as emotions.
Nevertheless, it is not an impossible task, and is not any more
difficult than determining such injuries as pain and suffering73 or
loss of consortium.74 No amount of money can place the plaintiffs
in the position of not having that child, but some effort must be
made to compensate them.
CONCLUSION
This article has examined wrongful birth actions in the abor-
tion area against the background of earlier wrongful birth cases.
The early cases, which arose in the context of contraception and
sterilization, denied recovery on the grounds that to allow the
action would violate public policy and would require speculation
and conjecture in the assessment of damages. Troppi5 rejected
those theories, allowing recovery of the expenses incident to rais-
ing a healthy but unplanned child. Thereafter, many predicted
an increased willingness of the courts to uphold wrongful birth
actions not only in the area of contraceptives but also in steriliza-
7 Justice Jacobs' dissent in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
was addressed to the argument that damages would be too speculative. He pointed out
that if a judicial system can grant damages for pain and suffering it should he able to
evaluate the injury to the plaintiffs in a wrongful birth case. Id. at 50. 227 A.2d at 704.
71 See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
7' Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
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tion and abortion cases. Roe v. Wade7" seemed to open the door
further in the abortion cases by invalidating the public policy
argument. However, the past four years have not produced the
expected trend. As this article has discussed, the courts have
acted with little predictability in wrongful birth actions. They
have confused issues, ignored important cases, and isolated
themselves from current social and philosophical attitudes.
The article has analyzed the four post-Troppi wrongful birth
cases dealing with abortions. As has been discussed, only
Ziemba77 recognized the impact of Roe. Rieck 7 was written as if
the case were being decided in the 1930's. The policy arguments
and fear of speculative damages so prevalent in early cases were
the foundation of the opinion. Jacobs79 and Dumere0 recognized
the right of a woman to choose whether or not to bear a child, even
though each was based on facts arising before Roe. However, the
damages in each case were limited to those incident to the baby's
deformity.
Having examined these four cases, as well as other opinions
in wrongful birth actions, this article has developed an approach
for handling an action where the doctor's alleged negligence pre-
cluded any opportunity for the parent to seek an abortion. The
basic premise is that the wrong to the parent has been denial of
the right to choose whether or not to continue the pregnancy. If
the parent can prove that a third person breached his duty of
reasonable care and in so doing denied the parent that choice, he
should be allowed to present the issue of damages to the trier of
fact. Roe signified the importance of that right to choose; to then
deny recovery against an individual whose negligence prevents
exercise of that option would be to vitiate that right. Further-
more, the finding of law that a child confers pure bliss on its
parents has been shown to be an unwarranted presumption. Any
benefits the plaintiffs' child may confer on them are mitigating
factors; they should not destroy the cause of action.
In approaching the damages issue the above discussion has
propounded balancing benefits and injuries as first suggested in
" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
7' Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W. 2d 242 (1974).
" Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
" Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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Troppi. Before any decision can be reached, however, the case
must be placed into one of three categories. Where the parents
wanted a child but were not informed of the pregnancy, they
probably have no actual damages; where they wanted a child but
were not informed of the likely possibility that the child would
be deformed, damages turn on whether the child is healthy;
where they did not want a child, damages do not depend on the
baby's being abnormal. Having determined whether the plaintiffs
have any actual damages, one then can apply the method of
weighing the pluses and minuses the child has brought the par-
ents. In so doing, the circumstances of that particular family
must be considered, and both the emotional and the more tangi-
ble factors must be weighed.
What will happen in future abortion wrongful birth cases
remaims to be seen. If the cases look to Roe, Troppi, and Ziemba
for guidance, and follow an approach similar to that set forth
above, plaintiffs will have a chance to prove their cases. However,
if the courts continue to ignore those cases, and to rely on the
antiquated arguments that originated in an entirely different
social and legal setting, plaintiffs will have little success.
Kim Lacy Morris
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